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Abstract 
This paper examines the UK and Irish Environmental Protection Agencies (EPAs) ability 
to move beyond regulatory compliance to support and promote sustainable environmental 
innovation, in short “eco-innovation”. To do so would require them to overcome the 
perception that they face, often being perceived as ‘policemen’ by the regulated business 
community. We propose a new empirically-derived theoretical construct called Voluntary 
Reciprocal Legitimacy (VRL), defined as the development of mutual trust between 
the regulator and business resulting in arrangements which generate eco-innovation 
benefits for the regulator, the regulated business communities and society at large. 
VRL adds a new category to Suchman’s (1995) theory of moral legitimacy as well as 
highlights how EPAs can build trust between themselves and regulated business, 
allowing a shift of the ‘beyond compliance’ legislative boundary. Such an approach 
supports eco-innovation whilst simultaneously protecting the natural environment. 
Keywords 
Environmental protection agencies, environmental innovation, sustainability, voluntary 
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Introduction 
Credibility of Environmental Protection Agencies (EPAs) in pursuing environmental 
regulatory activities is governed by its legitimacy.  This legitimacy can be seen as 
increasingly important in view of the recently enhanced role of British and Irish EPAs in 
relation to promoting eco-innovation and sustainable economic growth within their 
jurisdictions (SEPA, 2014; Environment Agency, 2015).  For example, the Regulatory 
Reform (Scotland) Act 2014 (section 51) recognises that protecting and improving the 
environment (including managing natural resources in a sustainable way) has high 
potential to contribute to improving the health and well-being of people, and to achieving 
sustainable economic growth, thus acting as a further stimulant to eco-innovation (SEPA, 
2016).  Discussion of the legitimacy of EPAs focuses on two elements: procedural and 
consequentialist legitimacy (Suchman, 1995).  Procedural legitimacy relates to the 
propriety of processes by which environmental regulations and policies are determined 
and implemented, and applies to whether environmental regulation is best made by 
government actors (Eden, 1999) or by non-state market actors (Cashore, 2002; Carmin et 
al., 2003). In addition, there follows the question of how environmental regulation has 
been institutionalised and legitimised in a particular context (Francesch-Huidobro, 2012). 
Consequentialist legitimacy concerns the extent to which these regulations are successful 
in achieving their goals (Eckersley, 2007).  
 
Sustainable-orientated innovation (henceforth eco-innovation), combining motivation and 
performance producing environmental benefits (Oltra et al, 2010) is regarded as critical 
to achieving sustainable economic growth. For instance, Adams et al, (2015) argue that 
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moving from incremental sustainable innovation to system-building, “beyond firm” 
innovation involves a paradigm shift that will entail “intimate, interdependent 
collaboration between previously unconnected actors, such as NGOs, industry 
associations and economic development organisations” (p.193).  Collaboration between 
regulators and business is, therefore, necessary to support the movement towards more 
radical environmental innovation underpinning sustainable economic growth (Berry and 
Rondinelli, 1998). 
 
Despite the desire for environmental well-being in societies, environmental regulation 
can often encounter resistance due to regulators lacking legitimacy in face of suspicions 
of “Big Government” and fears that regulation contradicts and limits the achievement of 
economic goals and growth (Herbert, 2014; Francesch-Huidobro et al., 2012).  The 
suspicion of “Big Government” is about procedural legitimacy, to do with the regulatory 
process, in this case, relating to whether the government is the right actor to regulate and 
whether it has excessive power in regulation (Eden, 1999).  The consequentialist stance 
on legitimacy considers the success with which intervention leads to positive 
environmental outcomes as a crucial part of the legitimacy of environmental regulation 
and policy (Eckersley, 2007), with judgements about the contribution of interventions 
and institutions to solving environmental problems necessary (Kronsell, 2013).  
Moreover, consequentialist legitimacy can be extended to consider the impact of 
intervention on sustainable economic growth (Herbert, 2014).   
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The economic impact of environmental regulation is linked to a body of research 
examining whether such regulation induces or stifles innovation in regulated industries 
(Porter and Van der Linde, 1995-a; Kesidou and Demirel, 2012; Wagner, 2003; Ambec et 
al, 2013; Allan et al., 2014; Cohen et al., 2013). Although under Suchman’s (1995) 
institutional perspective, an organisation’s legitimacy is socially constructed by its 
context, he argues that an organisation can manipulate its context to acquire legitimacy.  
This suggests that EPAs can take action to manage procedural and consequentialist 
legitimacy and, in so doing, legitimise their eco-innovation activities beyond regulatory 
compliance.  
  
The literature on the legitimacy of environmental regulation, procedural legitimacy and 
consequentialist legitimacy are often considered separately (Eckersley, 2007). Research 
on the legitimacy of environmental regulation is more concerned with the procedural 
legitimacy of regulation, in terms of regulatory processes and policy design (Cashore, 
2002; Eden, 1999; Francesch-Huidobro, 2012; Herbert, 2014).  However, processes that 
are effective in engaging stakeholders are of little value if few tangible outcomes are 
delivered by them in terms of achieving positive environmental outcomes for society.  In 
other research, more directly concerned with the impact of environmental regulation on 
innovation within firms, there is greater orientation towards the outcomes of 
environmental regulation in achieving sustainable economic growth, thus the rationale for 
consequentialist legitimacy of environmental regulation (Porter and Van der Linde, 1995-
a; Kesidou and Demirel, 2012; Fischer et al., 2003). Conversely, outcomes in terms of 
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regulations effectively stimulating environmental innovation can be undermined by poor 
policy design and limited stakeholder involvement.   
 
Few studies consider both forms of legitimacy explicitly in parallel which is intriguing 
given that they appear to be counterparts of each other (Eckersley, 2007; Kronsell, 2013). 
In this paper, it is argued that harnessing both procedural and consequentialist legitimacy 
simultaneously is of crucial importance for EPAs if the pursuit of their activities aimed at 
stimulating eco-innovation and sustainable economic growth requires resources from 
social groups, such as consent from the (regulated) business community, public 
agreement and governmental backing (Suchman, 1995). This legitimacy may partly 
depend on whether regulation is legitimated and institutionalised in the context in which 
they operate and on the attempts of regulators to forge legitimacy to further their own 
strategic needs (Francesch-Huidobro, 2012). If EPAs are to be successful in the pursuit of 
activities to stimulate eco-innovation and sustainable economic growth, they should 
harness procedural and consequentialist legitimacy in order to gain support and resources 
from the businesses that they regulate as well as government. 
 
Given the complexity and tensions identified in the literature – seeking collaboration yet 
suspicion of regulators, desire to support eco-innovation yet power dynamics between the 
actors, and the desire to create beneficial outcomes for environment, society and 
businesses, this paper examines the relationship between procedural and consequentialist 
legitimacy for EPAs. It is based on three empirical sources (i) a Pan-European EPA 
benchmarking exercise to identify current practices that support eco-innovation, (ii) 
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interviews with senior executives of the UK and Irish EPAs as well as representatives 
from business support agencies, and (iii) insights from a multi-stakeholder workshop 
involving EPA representatives from Scotland, England, Wales, Northern Ireland and the 
Republic of Ireland. It aims to explore the extent to which UK and Irish EPAs acquire 
procedural and consequentialist legitimacy in the pursuit of activities to promote eco-
innovation and, therefore, sustainable economic growth.  
 
This paper responds to the separation of procedural and consequentialist legitimacy in the 
literature by exploring how EPAs can gain, moral legitimacy through stimulating and 
supporting eco-innovation activities by the industries and businesses they regulate. The 
new empirically-derived construct introduced in this paper – Voluntary Reciprocal 
Legitimacy (VRL) – extends our understanding of the theory of moral legitimacy 
proposed by Suchman (1995). The VRL construct encapsulates the ways in which EPAs 
acquire both procedural and consequentialist legitimacy to advance their activities in 
promoting eco-innovation and, therefore, sustainable economic growth in ways that go 
beyond their regulatory compliance role. Procedural legitimacy is concerned with the 
nature of the processes of engagement between the EPA and regulated organisations to 
support eco-innovation. Consequentialist legitimacy is concerned with the extent that the 
outcomes of the processes of engagement promote beyond compliance that protects and 
improves the natural environment, and simultaneously creates sustainable economic 
growth and well-being benefits (Suchman, 1995).   In doing this, VRL will contribute to 
the reconciliation of legitimacy concepts that may be useful for environmental regulators 
in view of their pursuit of eco-innovation and sustainable growth. 
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The rest of the paper is set out as follows: next we discuss legitimacy theory – procedural 
and consequentialist – and its relevance to environmental regulation and eco-innovation; 
we then discuss the research context, data gathering and data analysis; we then present 
our empirical findings; this is followed by a discussion of the proposed new theoretical 
construct: VRL; finally we draw out conclusions including implications for policy and 
practice. 
Legitimacy theory and its application to environmental regulation  
In this section we will, firstly, discuss the evolution of the literature on legitimacy within 
the debate on environmental regulation and, secondly, focus more closely on the 
complexities of procedural and consequentialist legitimacy, drawing on Suchman’s 
(1995) seminal work on legitimacy theory. Suchman (1995) describes legitimacy as: 
 
“[…] a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are 
desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of 
norms, values beliefs and definitions” (p 574).  
 
Suchman (1995) argues that legitimacy enhances the durability of an organisation, as it is 
more likely to gain resources from social groups (and society more broadly) if its 
activities are perceived in a positive manner.  This, of course, may matter less for 
organisations that do not require resources from social groups; it may only be important 
to those organisations in that they do not lose their right to operate. Suchman (1995) 
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identifies three different forms of legitimacy: pragmatic, moral and cognitive legitimacy. 
Pragmatic legitimacy stems from whether the organisation’s activities can meet the self-
interested needs and motivations of its “immediate audience” (p.579) (e.g., shareholders). 
Moral legitimacy is about whether the organisation’s activities are regarded as being 
accepted by society, whereas cognitive legitimacy involves the acceptance of an 
organisation being self-evident and not subject to issues which involves the interests of 
different groups, or the evaluation of its activities from a moral perspective (see figure 1 
below highlighting the perceived distinction between procedural and consequentialist 
legitimacy). Procedural and consequentialist legitimacy, as mentioned above, belong to 
moral legitimacy and form the focus of this paper.   
[Insert figure 1 about here] 
 
Suchman (1995) further differentiates between institutional and strategic views of 
legitimacy, with the institutional lens being outside-in, whereby factors in an 
organisation’s context shape its legitimacy, such as the political climate and prevailing 
social norms.  In contrast, the strategic lens is inside-out, where an organisation attempts 
to shape its context to acquire legitimacy. The strategic lens refers both to how firms 
acquire moral legitimacy through improving their environmental performance and the 
way that regulators can acquire legitimacy for their “beyond compliance” activities to 
promote eco-innovation. Intriguingly, this distinction between institutional (outside-in) 
and strategic (inside-out) legitimacy is not made explicit in either the literature on 
environmental regulation or in the literature that examines the relationship between 
regulation and eco-innovation.  However, it is an important distinction. Whilst regulators 
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and businesses may have little influence on institutional legitimacy, Suchman’s theory 
suggests that they can gain procedural and consequentialist legitimacy through using 
strategic legitimacy. Yet this is not evident in the literature (see figure 2 below that links 
procedural and consequentialist legitimacy). We will now discuss procedural and 
consequentialist legitimacy in more detail in the context of environmental regulation.   
 
[Insert figure 2 about here] 
 
Procedural legitimacy in environmental regulation 
The procedural legitimacy of environmental regulation concerns the appropriateness of 
the policy implemented and/or the regulatory process. Procedural issues featured in the 
literature involve which actor is the most appropriate to engage in regulatory functions? 
(Cashore, 2002; Eden, 1999; Herbert, 2014); how the regulatory process is managed 
politically across central and local governments as well as citizens? (Francesch-
Huidobro, 2012; Kronsell, 2013; Herbert, 2014); and strategically with a wider range of 
other stakeholders (Carmin et al., 2003) where eco-innovation is a contested space? 
(Franceschini and Pansera, 2015).   
 
The issue of who has legitimacy to engage in environmental regulation may rest on 
perceptions of competency, based on “technocratic rationality” (Eden, 1999) and possible 
suspicion of excessive government intervention (Cashore, 2002; Herbert, 2014).  Eden 
(1999) is sceptical about the business community’s legitimacy in regulating itself in 
environmental matters.  She states that business associations place their legitimacy claims 
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on the argument that they have technocratic rationality; they are objective (as they are 
“apolitical”) and have relatively stronger expertise in dealing with environmental 
regulation compared to policymakers who implement this. However, although they may 
possess this expertise, Eden (1999) casts doubts on the industry and business objectivity 
claims given the economic interests they are charged with protecting.  Moreover, Eden 
argues that this technocratic rationality argument is often used by the business 
community to dominate the “environmental debate” and, more importantly, to exclude 
other constituent groups such as NGOs and citizens. Moreover, corporations internally 
often face competing goals and interests, implying that decision-making is not necessarily 
rational and, subject to learning (Simon, 1972; Simon, 1991). That is, in the presence of 
boundedly rational behaviour and myopia in organizational learning, biases in 
businesses’ strategic decision-making are likely to emerge (Levinthal and March, 1993), 
hence undermining technocratic rationality. 
 
Cashore (2002) suggests that this movement in favour of transferring control over 
regulation to “non-state market actors” stems from a suspicion of excessive government 
intervention, as this transference gives such non-state market actors the moral legitimacy 
to regulate the industry supply chain. Prominent examples of this regulation by non-state 
market actors are the forestry certificate programmes which emerged in response to 
boycott initiatives against the forestry industry, with these certificate programmes reliant 
on moral legitimacy conferred on them by environmental groups (Cashore, 2002). This 
aversion to “Big Government” is also discussed in Herbert (2014), where he argues that 
it is due to the perception and dislike of the “coercive role” (p.1792) of big government.  
11 
 
 
Cultural contexts may be conducive to non-state market actors enjoying greater moral 
legitimacy in environmental regulation compared to government bodies.  Both expertise 
and the political climate, namely the degree to which there is tolerance for government 
intervention, are important factors in determining which actor has legitimacy to engage in 
environmental regulation. It is, therefore, key to consider how this tension might be 
resolved. As mentioned before we will explore this tension by taking a three step research 
approach: Pan-European EPA benchmarking, one-to-one interviews with senior EPA 
executives, and a multi-stakeholder workshop. 
 
The process of making and implementing regulation is a core aspect of the procedural 
legitimacy of environmental regulation. Francesch-Huidobro (2012) stresses the need for 
political and institutional capacity, highlighting how the absence of both of these 
elements hampered the institutionalisation and legitimation of climate policy in the case 
of Hong Kong. She describes the public institutions that are responsible for establishing 
and implementing a climate plan, emissions targets and the regulation of environmental 
issues as “deficient”.  In another article, based on the Chinese city of Guangzhou, 
Francesch-Huidobro et al. (2012) suggest that it is often inter-institutional complexities, 
involving difficulties of public institutions working together, that frustrates 
implementation.  This is compounded by the resistance on the part of the business 
community in Hong Kong to environmental initiatives.  If non-state market institutions 
do not have the capacity to formulate policy properly, then it is difficult to gain 
stakeholder buy-in and, therefore, political legitimacy for regulation and policy 
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(Francesch-Huidobro, 2012).  Likewise, Kronsell (2013) discusses the building of 
political legitimacy of climate policies through citizen engagement in policy formulation.  
She cites the Green City of Freiburg as an example of strong procedural legitimacy in 
which there is both strong citizen engagement in climate policy and cross party support 
behind a form of “Green Conservatism” which reinforces the political legitimacy of 
environmental regulation. Wesselink et al. (2011) support this view, arguing that public 
participation in environmental policy making and governance reinforces legitimacy 
through making use of local knowledge and engaging groups normally excluded from 
policy making. In terms of strategic procedural legitimacy, Carmin et al. (2003) discuss 
voluntary environmental protection agreements of U.S. companies and claim that they 
can enhance their moral legitimacy if they involve stakeholders (e.g. environmental 
NGOs) in the design of relevant programmes. Gaining moral legitimacy for these 
agreements may prove important in avoiding negative action against a business, such as 
boycotts. However, to the best of our knowledge, there is little empirical evidence to 
highlight how voluntary agreements may enhance moral legitimacy of the key actors 
involved. 
Consequentialist legitimacy in environmental regulation 
In the economics and management literature on regulation and eco-innovation, a typical 
focal point is the degree to which regulations are efficient and effective in inducing 
compliance and environmental innovation within regulated industries.  Porter and Van 
der Linde (1995-b) challenge the notion that environmental regulation is a burden per se 
arguing that such regulation can lead to “innovation offsets” within firms whereby 
improvements in resource productivity outweigh the initial costs associated with the 
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regulation. They discuss “innovation-friendly regulation”, suggesting that regulation that 
encourages experimentation and risk taking, that is pre-emptive, that is flexible and that 
contains market incentives is more likely to be effective in stimulating eco-innovation. 
 
Kesidou and Demirel (2012) study this hypothesis empirically in the context of UK firms, 
finding that there is a “dual impact” of regulation at both ends of the spectrum.  They 
state that only the least and most innovative firms are driven by regulatory requirements.  
Least innovative firms may need to take action in response to the regulation in order to be 
compliant whereas highly innovative firms may perceive the regulation as an opportunity 
to gain first mover advantage in the market place. Kesidou and Demirel (2012) find 
further that there is little evidence to support the view that firms make investments in 
eco-innovation in response to societal pressures which points to the necessity of 
regulation to galvanise action on the part of firms. This finding in relation to the influence 
of societal pressure on eco-innovation also weakens the strategic view on legitimacy, 
whereby firms undertake eco-innovation in order to gain moral legitimacy from 
audiences in their context.  Bansal and Clelland (2004) highlight how the U.S. EPA 
influenced investors’ assessments of environmental legitimacy by releasing firms’ toxic 
release data.  Similarly to Kesidou and Demirel (2012), they do not suggest that this 
raising of stakeholder pressure on firms strongly induces eco-innovation; they claim, 
rather, that firms can manage poor environmental legitimacy through making a 
commitment to the environment or through engaging in public relations activities, 
instead.  
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Within the field of economics, the discussion of environmental regulation focuses on 
which type of regulatory instrument is the most economically efficient; in other words, 
which instrument is most cost-effective in delivering the best eco-innovation outcomes. 
For instance, Fischer et al. (2003) state that decisions about the right type of 
environmental regulation will depend on the economic and environmental context. They 
argue that the decision to adopt taxes or permits will depend on the slope of the marginal 
benefit curve from environmental innovation, if marginal benefits from additional 
environmental innovation fall away rapidly (the slope is steep), then abatement costs will 
be excessive under a tax and a market-based instrument, such as pollution permits, should 
be used. Wagner (2003) argued that market-based instruments which foster incentives for 
innovation and, even, voluntary agreements are preferable whereas Allan et al. (2014) 
argue that market-based instruments and more traditional regulation affect the diffusion 
of green technology differently. Reviewing literature on environmental regulation and 
innovation, Allan et al. (2014) reveal that regulations were important in driving the 
adoption of end-of-pipe technologies, such as pollution control mechanisms, whereas 
market-based instruments tended to shift companies towards more cost-efficient 
compliance methods. Polzin et al, (2016) consider the relationship between financial 
intermediaries and regulation that help or hinder eco-innovation. This highlights the need 
to assess the trade-off between costs and environmental benefits in designing regulations.  
 
Kronsell (2013) argues that both procedural and consequentialist legitimacy are 
contingent upon one another.  In the case of Green City Freiburg, the procedural 
legitimacy is dependent on achieving positive environmental outcomes. Without positive 
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environmental outcomes, political and citizen support would be jeopardised. Likewise, 
consequentialist legitimacy relies on procedural legitimacy, in the form of active citizen 
engagement in policy formulation and political consensus behind the green city plan. It is 
possible for limited procedural legitimacy to be compensated by high output legitimacy, 
but, in the case of Freiburg, there was a high level of both. An imbalance in legitimacy 
can be problematic and misleading according to Eckersley (2007). So, given the lack of 
clear evidence to support eco-innovation, the question arises as to how procedural and 
consequentialist legitimacy might be harnessed simultaneously by EPAs to support eco-
innovation? 
 
Research context, method and empirical findings 
Research context 
The nature and focus of the project involved the English, Welsh, Scottish, Northern Irish 
and Republic of Ireland EPAs. Moving beyond regulation to support eco-innovation and 
sustainable economic growth is beyond the legislative frameworks that underpin the 
legitimacy of these organisations. By jointly commissioning the project – Share109 work 
stream – the participating EPAs wished to explore potential opportunities for 
collaboration and learning around the theme ‘eco-innovation’. The multi-stakeholder and 
exploratory nature of the research with EPAs representing different geographies, different 
legislative frameworks, and different priorities provided a unique opportunity to conduct 
research to explore the “beyond compliance” issue (Yin, 2009). The agreement to engage 
in this multi-stakeholder project offered the opportunity to explore alternative views and 
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perspectives that would enable the research team to gain insights into common 
potentialities as well as barriers to achieving any such potentialities. 
Data acquisition 
A multi-method approach to data gathering was developed given the range and scope of 
empirical sources (Flanagan, 1954; Tremblay, 1982; Miles and Huberman, 1994; Symon, 
1998; Butterfield et al., 2005). The research project comprised three phases of data 
gathering. First, a Pan-European and pan-UK/Republic of Ireland benchmarking exercise; 
second, one-to-one interviews that were conducted with Chief and Senior Executives 
from across all of the participating EPAs; third, a two-day workshop which was held with 
thirteen representatives from all of the participating EPAs and business support agencies. 
Each phase is discussed in more detail next. 
 
The first phase was a Pan-European and pan-UK/Republic of Ireland benchmarking 
exercise, which was designed to understand current developments around eco-innovation 
in the EU. The EU was selected as it has an explicit agreement to be a key driver and 
global leader in environmental management practices (EU Climate and Energy 
Framework, 2030). In phase 1 of the project data was gathered from a wide range of 
websites, including EPAs in and outside of Europe, as well as the participating UK and 
Irish EPAs. In addition, key databases such as that provided by the EU Network for the 
Implementation and Enforcement of Environment Law (IMPEL) were carefully 
examined. Also in the first phase each of the UK and Irish EPAs were benchmarked 
against each other. By benchmarking, the intention was to highlight insights into how the 
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participating EPAs might promote eco-innovation to support sustainable economic 
growth.  
 
The second phase comprised fourteen one-to-one interviews that were conducted with 
Chief and Senior Executives from across all of the participating EPAs to seek their views 
about eco-innovation for sustainable economic growth. The interviews followed a set of 
open-ended questions (see below) which were designed to facilitate a conversation that 
would be emergent in nature. Each interview was recorded verbatim and lasted 45-60 
minutes. During the interview the interviewer summarised key issues to both seek 
confirmation of understanding as well as to provide a reflective moment for the 
interviewee (King, 1994; Bray, 2000).   
 
The interviews were semi-structured in nature (Seidman 1998, Lincoln & Guba 1985), 
consisting of five open questions, based around themes that emerged from the previous 
literature review and desk research stages.  Initially, the One Planet Living Framework 
(Bioregional, 2016) was introduced to explain the context of the research to the 
participants.  This framework is intended to help organisations analyse the “sustainability 
challenges faced, develop appropriate solutions and communicate the actions being taken 
to key stakeholders” (Bioregional, 2016).  Respondents were initially asked an open 
question about what they understood the general role of regulatory agencies to be in 
promoting sustainable economic growth.  This question would elicit perceptions relating 
to the boundaries and scope of environmental regulators’ interventions in the promotion 
of sustainable economic growth.  The second question related to how environmental 
regulators could promote sustainable organizational innovations.  These innovations 
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corresponded to environmental management systems, such as ISO14001 and measures to 
improve the sustainability of supply chains – indirect mechanisms to change behaviour in 
regulated firms.  Respondents were then asked about more direct interventions, primarily 
environmental regulations designed to stimulate more sustainable business decisions, 
such as pollution control measures, for example.  Question four related to more radical 
approaches that regulators could take, namely promoting incubators for green 
entrepreneurs and promoting the development of export markets for environmental 
innovations created by regulated firms. Towards the end of the interview, a more open-
ended question was asked about the future possibilities that regulators could pursue in 
light of current trends – this question would look forward to potential developments in 
the next few years. 
 
These questions were derived from the literature review (refer to the Interview Guide at 
Appendix 1).  Question two was inspired by the organizational innovation category of 
Oltra, Kemp, and de Vries (2010) which refers to environmental management and audit 
mechanisms intended to improve within-firm sustainability.  The discussion about the 
types of regulatory instrument which are more effective at stimulating innovation 
(Fischer et al, 2003; Kesidou and Demirel, 2012; Porter and Van der Linde, 1995-b) 
influenced question three.  Question four about technology development and green 
entrepreneurship was derived from this concept around sustainable innovation at the 
system level compared to more reactive, incremental innovation (Adams et al, 2015). 
Question five was forward looking, concerned with the current and future trends and 
developments in environmental regulation.  It is was inspired by the existence of the 
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OECD’s Green Growth policy, encouraging governments of advanced countries to link 
environmental and economic reforms to ensure a sustainable economic recovery, with the 
help of specific indicators to measure progress towards this Green Growth (OECD, 2015; 
OECD, 2017). 
 
The questions were designed to stimulate discussion about the role of the participating 
EPAs in bringing forward the more incremental sustainable innovations as well as the 
system-oriented “beyond-firm” innovations (Adams et al., 2015).  Prior to the interviews 
with the senior executives of the EPAs, a pilot interview was conducted with a retired 
senior manager of an EPA. This pilot interview was subsequently used to test the 
dependability and credibility of the interview schedule (Guba and Lincoln, 1981).  This 
process also helped to both sharpen the questions and gave rise to further issues for 
exploration in subsequent interviews, in particular, the importance of moving from 
prescriptive to more sophisticated regulation was emphasized in this pilot interview.   
 
The third phase involved a two-day workshop which was held with thirteen 
representatives from all of the participating EPAs and business support agencies (Scottish 
Enterprise and Highlands and Islands Enterprise) to share and explore the findings of the 
research derived from phases 1 and 2. Two of the representatives had been interviewed 
under phase 2. The workshop was designed to provide time and space to identify areas 
for common development (Flanagan, 1954; Butterfield et al., 2005) and opportunities to 
go beyond compliance with respect to supporting eco-innovation initiatives. 
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Data analysis 
The benchmarking exercise in the first phase identified two main themes: (i) efforts to 
support beyond compliance, and (ii) efforts to improve compliance. In the first of these 
two themes commonalities across the benchmarked agencies included: (i) variation in 
support for eco-innovative technologies, (ii) focus on development of export markets, 
(iii) requirement for sustainable procurement, and (iv) creating demand for eco-
innovations. In the second theme commonalities across the benchmarked agencies 
included: (i) pre-emptive regulations, (ii) regulatory design and (iii) information policies. 
The evolution and focus differed between the benchmarked EU regulatory agencies, with 
Denmark consistently ahead of the participating agencies with initiatives to support eco-
innovation. The research themes identified from the desk-research were confirmed and 
enriched at the workshop stage. 
 
All interview data gathered in the second phase were transcribed and analysed, key 
themes were identified and coded by the interviewer; codes are “labels that assign 
symbolic meaning to the descriptive inferential information compiled during the study” 
(Miles et al., 2014, 71).  The interview guide was directed by the main concepts featured 
in the literature review and refined following the pilot interview. To ensure inter-coder 
reliability, namely whether members of the research team would code the data in a 
similar way (Campbell et al., 2013), a sample of transcripts was sent to a member of the 
research team for independent coding. The two sets of interview codes and themes were 
then reviewed by a third member of the research team, from which a stable set of codes 
emerged. Following the interview and workshop stages of the data collection, first order 
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codes were applied to the empirical data (Saldaña, 2015, Miles et al., 2014).  Typical 
codes which emerged at this stage included: (i) tension between roles of the regulators (ii) 
perceptions of regulation as burdensome (iii) experimentation and flexibility (iv) 
engagement with businesses, (v) ‘policeman’ role, (vi) showcasing best practice (vii) 
market credibility through accreditation and (viii) supporting exports.   
The members of the research team immersed themselves in the data from the interviews 
and workshop and subsequently reflected on the first order themes, making memos to 
explore these themes and find underlying patterns (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000).    In 
reviewing these first order codes, it became apparent that a transcending theme was 
“legitimacy”, based on Suchman’s (1995) concepts explained above. In this respect, 
procedural legitimacy related to the codes to do with what was “proper” for a regulator to 
do, in view of its role, and this would relate to the codes about role tension, whether 
regulation was burdensome and the ‘policeman’ role.  Consequentialist  legitimacy 
related to the codes about the effectiveness of the regulators’ activities in promoting 
‘beyond compliance’, corresponding the themes relating to experimentation, engagement 
with regulated businesses and supporting exports.   
 
The data was re-considered in light of this ‘legitimacy’ framework, which led to the 
emergence of the following overarching patterns: (i) boundary scope (ii) partnership 
working and (iii) institutional-strategic influence.  From these higher-order codes, the 
theoretical construct of voluntary reciprocal legitimacy was developed. 
 
In phase three of the project an independent research observer captured in vivo comments 
from participants throughout the workshop as they discussed the findings from phase 1 
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and 2. These comments were analysed for critical incidents, initially based on the level of 
discussion as well as the level and diversity of views surfaced in the workshop (Flanagan, 
1954; Butterfield et al., 2005). These were discussed outside of the workshop to develop 
a deeper understanding of the significance of each critical incident.  Workshops 
effectively provided an opportunity to explore and confirm/disconfirm data from the 
interview stage and, therefore, enhanced the generalizability of the research findings 
(Denzin and Lincoln, 2000).    
 
The analysis of the workshop data, including critical incidents and reflective notes 
revealed three major inter-related findings. The first finding related to questioning the 
role and limits of the regulator. The legislative framework and the priority of Government 
to either support eco-innovation or limit the nature of regulation is decisive in 
determining the scope enjoyed by the regulator. The second finding related to the extent 
to which EPAs work with other agencies could support beyond compliance. A challenge 
for the EPAs in seeking partnerships is the need to avoid straying into the domain of the 
partner. The third finding related to the relationship between ‘institutional (outside-in) 
and strategic (inside-out) influences’ and how these help or hinder the EPAs in 
encouraging and supporting eco-innovation. We present a summary of the data analysis 
from the three sources of empirical evidence to highlight the major common themes 
emerging from the data analysis. After reviewing the data from the various phases, three 
major inter-related themes were identified: “boundary scope”, “partnership working”, and 
“forces driving eco-innovation”. Table 1 below provides a summary of these common 
themes. 
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Common theme Benchmarking Interviews Workshop 
Boundary scope Encourage and 
influence 
sustainable 
procurement in 
supply chains 
Interpretation of 
regulatory reform 
agenda and how far 
to stretch 
Role and limitation 
of regulator 
    
Partnership working Regulator support to 
develop export 
markets in 
conjunction with 
trade development 
body  
Flexibility and 
experimentation 
with new initiatives 
with business 
development agency 
Partnership working 
to support beyond 
compliance 
    
Forces driving eco-
innovation 
Regulator support 
for eco-innovation 
technologies 
Conflict between 
regulatory and 
compliance-plus 
roles 
Mechanisms 
available to support 
eco-innovation 
 Create demand for 
eco-innovation 
Level of 
engagement with 
business 
 
  Showcasing 
examples of good 
practice 
 
  Approach to 
contributing to eco-
innovation 
 
 
 Table1: summary of common themes 
Findings 
We now discuss thee three findings in more detail, with empirical exemplars, including 
empirical exemplars from phases one, two and three, as these are central to the 
development of our contribution. Interview respondents from the second phase have 
labels RA if they come from a regulatory agency, and BSA if they come from a business 
support agency. 
 
Boundary scope 
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A number of critical incidents arose during the workshop (which on reflection the issues 
were also noted in the semi-structured interviews). First, was the questioning of the 
“remit of the bodies” and the “extent of impartiality of the regulator”. This issue was also 
identified in the interviews noted above, the conflict between regulatory and compliance 
and the integrity of their role. One exemplar conversation between participants was: 
 
“Are the regulators active in the promotion of a particular technology? Are the 
regulators supporting the comparative advantage of their country?” 
 
This conversation led into the ‘boundary scope’ of the regulator. This concept raises the 
issue of what is the legitimate sphere for regulatory compliance and going beyond 
compliance. Extending the critical incident above, the participants went onto further 
discuss the role of the regulator covering the relationship between banks, eco-innovation 
equipment manufacturers who supply and export their equipment, and the regulator who 
certifies the equipment. The banks provided investment funding and export support, and 
the regulators who certified the equipment indirectly promote it.  
 
During the workshop a clear difference emerged between the UK and Irish EPAs about 
the constraint of and requirement to work within the relevant country’s legislative 
framework. In particular, these legislative frameworks differ across the geographic 
domains. There was a clear split between those domains that facilitated beyond 
compliance but within the legislative framework, and other domains which were more 
restrictive. The more restrictive legislative frameworks were based on ensuring that the 
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minimum regulatory compliance met without imposing unnecessary cost or bureaucracy 
on a business or industry. The domains which facilitated beyond compliance but within 
the legislative framework encouraged the regulator to work closely with regulated 
businesses to help them become more efficient, for example, by reducing waste. 
 
Two key insights emerged in this phase. First, ‘beyond compliance’ activities were 
undertaken within the domain-specific regulatory framework, and, second, there was a 
perceived tension within the EPAs on how their role may be perceived: inhibiting 
businesses growth or supporting achievement of business objectives. The overall 
conclusion was succinctly noted by one of the participants: 
 
“Trust, how do we gain it? How do we improve engagement? There seems to be 
so many barriers for the regulator. What is the balance between regulatory 
activities and non-regulatory methods, for example, a planning role, a science 
role, a community engagement role? How do we develop a soft influence?”  
 
Here we see the issue of ‘boundary scope’ as a major consideration. As one participant 
commented: 
 
“We have a dichotomy as we have to have a ‘policeman role’ with a desire to 
have a ‘business support role’”. 
 
In one of the interviews this theme was mentioned by interview respondent BSA-1, 
likening the tension of this dual role with that of: 
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“…. a policeman giving you advice whilst you are breaking into a house”. 
 
As one workshop participant commented: 
“The primary role is preventative, prevent resource decline and conserve wealth.”  
 
The level of engagement with sophisticated businesses, with mature practices and 
processes, also raises ‘boundary scope’ issues. First, it requires the EPA to develop a 
detailed understanding of the economics of the regulated industry and market 
environment that they wish to engage with. Without such knowledge and understanding 
there would be a credibility barrier to working with the management team in the 
(particular) industry. This point about credibility was emphasised in the interviews which 
indicated a need to overcome negative associations of environmental regulators, with 
respondent RA-4 commenting: 
 
“There is a need to get a negative public image, need to change image to show 
that we are not a bunch of tree-huggers”. 
 
Whilst large and sophisticated organisations are confident in dealing with health and 
safety and environmental regulatory bodies, the workshop identified that there is a 
tension with the regulator providing business support on the one hand, being a regulator 
(e.g. the policeman role) on the other hand, and simultaneously supporting eco-
innovation. This is even more pronounced when the participants discussed the small and 
medium sized enterprise (SME) level. 
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Partnership working 
 
One area that emerged from the interviews that showed potential for going ‘beyond 
compliance’ was partnership working. This covers inter-agency partnerships between 
EPAs and other agencies. It was recognised that the inter-agency partnership could 
support three common areas: (1) sharing best practices, (2) collaboration on existing 
framework projects, and (3) experimentation to develop new projects and initiatives.  One 
example from the workshop that highlights the tension for the EPAs in all three areas to 
partnership working was noted when one participant commented: 
 
“We work within our legislative framework, so how do we develop new markets?  
Is it directly to drive eco-innovation or indirectly to create markets through 
facilitating dialogue?”     
 
In supporting eco-innovation, EPAs implemented so-called Environmental Technology 
Verification (ETV) schemes. An ETV is a voluntary approach to support technological 
innovations and is designed around eight steps, covering initial eligibility assessment, 
ETV proposal, technology description, technology performance, verification agreement, 
verification protocol, assessment and final report. However, it does not fulfil the desire to 
go ‘beyond compliance’. As one participant noted: 
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“The pre-commercialisation stage is the key (primarily step one with links to steps 
two and three), yet the ETV protocol engagement between key parties is lacking”. 
 
This insight that the ETV protocol engagement is lacking indicated a feeling that 
regulated businesses are not fully aware of the value of this mechanism, which could 
potentially improve their market credibility among adopters of their technology, 
including customers and governments. The ETV programme is an example of the 
potential for effective partnership working between the EPAs and firms which directly 
helps innovative technologies to reach the market (within the legislative framework). 
Interview remarks also reflected the collaborative role that EPAs and firms could enjoy, 
with EPAs as enablers, with respondent RA-3 stating: 
“The regulator shouldn’t be viewed as a barrier to development; it should be 
approached at an early stage about permits and licencing”. 
Similarly, respondent RA-4 highlighted the way that Prosperity Agreements could help: 
“…anticipate problems before they happen, moving away from the ‘tick box’ idea 
to the more strategic approach”. 
 
Institutional-strategic influences 
 
Institutional influences cover a wide range of factors that shape the legitimacy of EPAs.  
Whilst pursuing the same end goals of environmental protection and maintaining 
environmental resources, as well as supporting the replenishment of these resources as 
they are used, the outside-in factors were distinctly different between the UK and Irish 
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EPAs context. The outside-in factors ranged from supportive and facilitating legislative 
frameworks to restrictive and constraining legislative frameworks. For example, in one 
jurisdiction the ‘one planet living’ with its ten guiding principles has been an 
underpinning philosophy (Bioregional, 2016).  
 
The tension between the legislative frameworks was clear when one participant 
commented: “We want to make our message clear by adopting the principles of 
sustainability of natural resources”. Yet a participant from another jurisdiction 
commented that the “grand narrative message from Government was no gold plating” to 
ensure there were no restrictive burdens on the business community as economic growth 
was the priority as part of the regulatory reform agenda. Additionally, there appeared to 
be a clear boundary separation between EPAs where each agency can have different focal 
points and priorities. 
 
Strategic influence recognises the ambition, ability and actions of EPAs to go beyond 
compliance and support eco-innovation. For instance, through setting up a voluntary 
programme (such as the aforementioned ETV), an EPA could gain greater moral 
legitimacy, which could facilitate the development of trust. Indeed, there was a 
suggestion in the interviews that regulators could use their position of status to aid 
businesses develop export markets, furthering this strategic influence, with BSA-2 
stating: 
“It could provide feedback for Scottish companies and ‘open doors’ for export 
opportunities, as SEPA is trusted it has a higher status”. 
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Whilst there were moments where the workshop offered varied views on the strategic 
aspect of going beyond compliance, it did not receive an enthusiastic reception. One 
participant asked the question: “Is this approach benchmarked across UK EPAs, across 
EU EPAs, and did it create a comparative advantage?” This skepticism and tension for 
EPAs was further reflected when one participant noted that “political commitment was 
vital in developing the Environment Bill which provides the well-being of future 
generations as a unique foundation”.  
 
There were two notable exceptions to this situation. The first is the Vision in Business for 
the Environment of Scotland (VIBES), which is an annual recognition and reward system 
for large organisations as well as start-ups and SMEs that are engaging in eco-innovation. 
The second is Northern Ireland’s voluntary ‘Prosperity Agreements’ implemented in 
2014, designed to help the EPA and businesses to explore opportunities to reduce 
environmental impacts in ways that create prosperity and well-being. Here outcomes are 
discussed and agreed between the regulator and the regulated businesses. These 
prosperity agreements are intended to balance compliance and beyond compliance, and to 
change business perceptions towards sustainability. Both of these exceptions can be 
considered as “innovation inducing mechanisms” (Lim and Prakash, 2014, p 234). Within 
the interviews, it was stressed that, in order to play an enabling role in innovation, 
regulators had to embrace more constructive instruments to trigger sustainable 
innovation, with respondent RA-7 discussing the need for different ways of motivating 
firms than traditional regulations: 
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“…direct regulations prevent people doing the wrong thing, but they are 
ineffective at getting people to do the right thing”. 
The VIBES Awards and Prosperity Agreements embody more constructive and 
sophisticated enabling mechanisms. 
 
Towards a voluntary reciprocal legitimacy framework 
 
The findings derived from the three sources of empirical evidence revealed a tension for 
EPAs as they search for means to move beyond compliance with regulation and to 
promote eco-innovation. On the one hand there is a need to maintain their integrity and 
impartiality to act as a regulator to ensure – and when required enforce – compliance.  On 
the other hand, some EPAs have the aspiration to support eco-innovation as a strategy to 
support sustainable economic growth and environmentally driven entrepreneurship. 
Would striving for the latter impact on the former? If EPAs are recognised primarily as a 
regulator by the industry/public, how would they be perceived in their intent to support 
eco-innovation, which may benefit industry with potential benefits to society at large? 
The dialogue from all of the EPAs emphasised the importance of meeting their regulatory 
responsibilities, but also acknowledged that there were varying contextual constraints and 
support that influenced their role and ability to effectively stimulate and pursue eco-
innovation. We will discuss regulatory-scope limitations, beyond regulatory-scope 
limitations, and theorizing VRL next. 
 
Regulatory-scope limitations 
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At one end of the regulatory-scope spectrum there was a constraining political, legislative 
and public funding context that signifies governments’ classic view of regulation being 
(potentially) burdensome and a ‘cost’ to business. At the other end of the spectrum was 
an enabling legislative context that aims at promoting environmentally benign business 
and industry activities, such as stimulating eco-innovation. Regardless of the end of the 
spectrum that the UK and Irish EPAs are located, the current legislative frameworks 
impose a constraint, or boundary-scope limitation, on the EPAs ability to pursue 
regulatory activities that are beyond their enforcement and compliance role. This 
constraint is both legislative and socially constructed, both by the members of the EPAs 
who perceive it is not their role to go beyond regulation, as well as the government 
through their ideological stance on regulation. 
 
The findings highlighted the importance of the UK and Irish EPAs working with a wide 
range of other public sector body partners to achieve the goal of environmental 
protection. Surprisingly, although partnership working was an approach to help garner a 
wider range of stakeholders, this activity is constrained by mandate and scope and is thus 
a factor that reinforces the constraints on the EPAs to support activity ‘beyond 
compliance’. Each agency/partner has a clear purpose, remit and mandate, and they have 
to recognise each other’s scope of activity has a constraining effect. 
 
Beyond regulatory-scope limitations  
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The empirical evidence revealed two initiatives that appear not to be constrained by 
legislative frameworks or socially constructed narratives. Both of these initiatives are 
linked by their ‘voluntary’ nature and approach, between the EPAs and the organisations 
that engaged with and participated in the initiatives to support eco-innovation.  
 
The first initiative VIBES, is led by Scottish Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) 
and a wide range of partners, including the Scottish Government, Highlands & Islands 
Enterprise, Scottish Enterprise, Energy Saving Trust, Scottish Water, Zero Waste 
Scotland and the 20:20 Climate Group. The VIBES awards aim to encourage the efficient 
use of natural and man-made resources, enhance the competitiveness of businesses, 
improve environmental performance and support the wider goals of sustainable 
development including social benefits through community and staff involvement. VIBES, 
introduced in 1999, is a voluntary environmental awards programme. For the entrants and 
category winners it represents an opportunity to achieve recognition in terms of brand 
value, reputational value and marketing value through showcasing that they achieved 
compliance with environmental regulations and/or beyond compliance eco-innovation. 
These businesses demonstrate best-practice beyond compliance in putting 
environmentally responsible practices and innovation at the centre of their core economic 
activity. SEPA’s central and proactive role in the VIBES scheme sends a number of 
important signals to the wider market. Firstly, the scheme provides an opportunity to 
achieve brand recognition. It reinforces that whilst environmental compliance is a 
minimum acceptable threshold, businesses should see the environment not as a burden 
but as an opportunity which can enhance their competitiveness. Secondly, the scheme 
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enables companies to gain recognition through their development of entrepreneurial and 
innovative environmental technologies. As a result of the ensuing media reporting of the 
businesses involved in the VIBES awards, many of these innovations will compete and 
grow successfully by solving environmental problems that subsequently contribute to 
stimulating sustainable economic growth. 
 
The Northern Ireland Environment Agency launched an innovative voluntary programme 
called ‘Prosperity Agreements’ in early 2014.  These agreements are designed to 
encourage businesses to go beyond compliance, to reduce environmental damage, as well 
as to protect future heritage. The intention of this initiative is to achieve the goal of 
greater societal prosperity and well-being. Prosperity agreements cover a wide range of 
issues including reduction of carbon emissions, reduction of waste, efficiency of water 
use and other resources, as well as efficiency in the supply chain with explicit criteria 
covering commitment, action and outcome. The first Prosperity Agreement was agreed in 
August 2014 with two businesses – Linden Foods Limited (a meat processing firm) and 
Linergy Limited (an energy-from-waste business). Since then the Northern Ireland 
Environment Agency has agreed a Prosperity Agreements with Larfarge Tarmac, John 
Thompsons and Sons, and Coca-Cola HBC Northern Ireland Ltd. 
 
Theorizing VRL 
 
From our research we can carve out a new construct for moral legitimacy, thereby 
extending  Suchman’s (1995) four forms of legitimacy: (i) consequential legitimacy (or 
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evaluations of outputs and consequences), (ii) procedural legitimacy (or evaluations of 
techniques and procedures), (iii) structural legitimacy (or evaluations of categories and 
structures), and (iv) personal legitimacy (or evaluations of leaders and representatives). 
We have identified from the empirical evidence the construct of ‘voluntary reciprocal 
legitimacy’ (VRL). VRL is defined here as the development of mutual trust between the 
regulator and business that results in agreements which generate a range of benefits for 
the regulator, the business and society. VRL goes beyond the legislative and regulatory 
frameworks by extending the regulator’s and business’s sphere of influence helping them 
to bring about change that protects the environment resource base whilst simultaneously 
creating new and previously untapped sources of wealth, a ‘win-win’ for all parties (see 
figure 3 below for the impact of VRL to create mutual trust through win/win’ eco-
innovation). To support eco-innovation it would require the EPAs to “challenge the 
prevailing wisdom and to take risks (Rainey and Esty, 2016, p 408). Let us see how VRL 
would work in the context of the other distinguished forms of legitimacies. 
 
[Insert figure 3 about here] 
 
Consequential legitimacy focuses on the accomplishment of activities which 
subsequently gain legitimacy through acceptance by society. Consequential legitimacy is 
understood in terms of “the technical properties of outputs that are socially defined and 
do not exist in some concrete sense that allows them to be empirically discovered” 
(Meyer et al., 1991, p 55). Society subsequently defines such characteristics. Within the 
aforementioned ‘Prosperity Agreements’ VRL can occur prior to the achievement of 
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legitimacy as the proposed outcomes are negotiated and agreed between the regulator and 
the business prior to any activity or recognition by society. For instance, within the 
VIBES Awards a business initiates an activity that they perceive as being beneficial to an 
environmental resource (i.e. recycling and waste management) for which they are 
subsequently recognised through an award scheme. Over time the VIBES awards scheme 
facilitates the development of mutual respect between the regulator, business and society, 
and may encourage other businesses to act in a similarly environmentally responsible 
manner. 
 
Procedural legitimacy focuses on the replication of established practices which are also 
accepted by society (Scott, 1977). In both the ‘Prosperity Agreements’ and VIBES 
awards initiatives, the empirical evidence underpinning VRL highlighted the high levels 
of experimentation, trialing, and testing without any initial guaranteed success for the 
businesses or social acceptance. Such processes can be best understood as pre-discovery 
by society, and are undertaken in conditions of uncertainty and ambiguity (Sengers et al, 
2016). The fundamental issue here is the creation of trust between the regulator and 
businesses to ensure that the eco-innovations pursued are recognised as ‘prosocial’ rather 
than just self-serving (for the company). The lack of certainty of outcome success arising 
from the experimentation, trialing and testing on the part of businesses is a key element 
of the trust-building. Regulators place trust in businesses that they will fulfil the 
environmental aims contained within the prosperity agreements. The importance of 
recognising experimentation, trialling and testing is supported by Porter and Van der 
Linde (1995-a), Wagner (2003), Johnstone et al., (2010) and Ambec et al, (2013), all 
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stressing the importance of building in flexibility and experimentation into regulations in 
order to promote eco-innovation. 
 
Structural legitimacy focuses on the legitimacy bestowed by society to an organisation 
because of its characteristics that are worthy of societal support. In the case of businesses 
engaging with the VIBES awards, many of whom are SMEs; society is unaware of the 
structural characteristics of these SMEs. SEPA engages with this sector as the SME 
believes that their core activities are eco-innovative. VRL occurs as the regulator (SEPA) 
undertakes extensive research of the background, vision and activities of the SMEs. Two 
important aspects need to be highlighted here. First, societal affirmation may occur after 
publicity arising from the involvement with (and perhaps the winning of) a VIBES 
award. Such an approach helps the SME to gain legitimacy from society that they 
otherwise might not be able to acquire. Second, SMEs typically tend to be suspicious of 
EPAs and these awards are another feature of building mutual trust (EPA workshop 
participant). 
 
Personal legitimacy emerges from the personal characteristics of organisational leaders, 
which is “relatively transitory and idiosyncratic” (Suchman, 1995: 581). Whilst 
recognising the leadership capabilities in organisations that engage with both the 
‘Prosperity Agreements’ and the VIBES awards, these mutually beneficial outcomes are 
based on sustainability of actions. Such sustainability is beyond the individual and 
characteristics on any leader. Fundamental to VRL is the embedding of activities within 
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an organisation to ensure that sustainable leadership it is not transitory or reliant on a key 
individual. 
 
VRL has emerged from our empirical evidence as the EPAs seek to move beyond 
compliance activity to support eco-innovations. The ‘Prosperity Agreements’ and the 
VIBES awards are exemplars of how business is willing and able to move beyond 
regulation, how business understands the benefits of eco-innovation, overcoming ‘the 
policeman’ perception of the regulator, and highlights how mutual trust between the 
regulator and business can produce societal benefits without prior legitimacy. This is 
important as the time lag between introducing eco-innovation and gaining societal 
awareness is by its nature long term. Compressing this time period, hence accelerating 
the speed of developing and implementing eco-innovations, can lead to a faster 
internalisation of negative externalities such as pollution, climate change and waste. This 
benefits not only businesses but society at large. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper explored ways in which environmental regulators may acquire both 
procedural and consequentialist legitimacy to advance their activities in promoting eco- 
innovation, which can subsequently be conducive to sustainable economic growth. We 
suggest the creation of a new form of legitimacy called Voluntary Reciprocal Legitimacy 
(VRL). This construct highlights how environmental regulators can harness award 
schemes and voluntary agreements to move business beyond regulatory compliance 
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activities and promote eco- innovation; two areas in which the regulators have 
traditionally lacked legitimacy. Underlying VRL is mutual trust between regulators and 
businesses, where mutual trust is accumulated through awards, such as VIBES and 
through mechanisms like Prosperity Agreements. Our contribution is two-fold. The first 
contribution is theoretical in extending Suchman’s (1995) legitimacy framework with the 
development of a new category, voluntary reciprocal legitimacy, as well as applying it to 
a new context – environmental regulation and environmental or eco-innovation. The 
second contribution is our practical contribution, in identifying how regulators can 
overcome the legitimacy barrier of ‘beyond regulatory compliance’ to support 
environmental innovation. This contribution will help regulators overcome the 
‘policeman’ perception often held by businesses. We now explore the implications of this 
contribution for both policy and practice. 
 
Implications for policy 
 
There are two inter-related demands in relation to how regulators go about acquiring 
VRL.  First, is the importance of the regulators adopting schemes like the VIBES awards 
and Prosperity Agreements as a way of building voluntary reciprocal legitimacy to 
encourage and support eco-innovation by business. Second, but equally important, is the 
contribution of VRL highlighting the importance of the regulators working reduce the 
‘policeman’ perception (whilst still maintaining their regulatory role) to open up a more 
fruitful relationship between them and business. By recognising the potential of such 
awards and schemes, regulators will be able to develop greater legitimacy. Currently 
legitimacy of EPAs is derived from legislation, helping them to achieve their goals and 
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make a positive contribution to natural resource protection, whilst supporting 
environmental innovation and sustainable economic growth. 
 
Not all jurisdictions in the UK and Republic of Ireland legislatively or implicitly support 
such an approach. In some jurisdictions there is a paradox where constraints are placed 
on the EPAs as they are viewed as an unnecessary cost of enforcing environmental 
protection, whereas our study highlights EPAs’ potential contribution to sustainable 
economic growth by going ‘beyond compliance’. The discussion provides insightful 
analysis from the Scottish and Irish regulatory context, but it also reveals a deficit in 
other jurisdictions. In the case of the Environment Agency, beyond compliance activities 
and supporting innovation activities tend to be more restricted. There is an opportunity to 
understand how the lessons regarding VRL apply to the English regulator or, if they do 
not, why. Likewise, the Welsh regulator does not seem to have this strong focus on 
Prosperity Agreements or awards, but, has developed its sustainable natural resource 
management concept.  
 
Implications for practice 
 
The VIBES awards cuts across many industrial sectors and size of business. VIBES 
awards cover start-ups, small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), national business 
and multi-national businesses’. Engaging with start-ups and SMEs is potentially an 
under-developed and untapped business sector. Engaging with SMEs is insightful as the 
VIBES awards appear to be a way of engaging with this harder-to-reach group of 
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businesses. Mutual trust will be a key factor in encouraging SMEs to see the value to 
their business of engaging with environmental innovation. 
 
Further research is needed on other voluntary schemes in other contexts to determine 
their impact, whether they enhance trust and legitimacy between the regulator and 
regulated businesses, or not. Further research is needed to better understand the 
longitudinal impact, if any, of voluntary award schemes, such as the VIBES awards, as 
these may act as vehicle for other EPAs to support and encourage eco-innovation. Are the 
awards beneficial over the long-run? Do the awards make no long-run beneficial 
contribution? In addition, we have highlight the need for further research to identify how 
such approaches may be embedded in existing EPA organisational systems and 
approaches. Without such consistency in approaches there is likely to be confusion in the 
approach adopted by business, especially by entrepreneurial SMEs, when they are 
considering investing in eco-innovation activities. Without such consistency EPAs are 
likely to inadvertently create uncertainty, which negatively impact eco-innovative 
activities in the realm low carbon technology (Uyarra et al, 2016).  
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Interview guide         Appendix 1 
Share 109 Project Interview Schedule 
 Interviewee: Blogs        Organisation:  
 
 
Venue:  Date:  Time:  
Introductions and 
Background to Research 
Project (One Planet 
Framework) 
(Bioregional, 2016) 
Introduce to interviewee One Planet 
Framework and rationale behind 
project  
 
Question 1 
(General role of EPAs in 
sustainable economic 
growth) 
(SEPA, 2014; Environment 
Agency, 2015) 
How can regulatory agencies like 
“X” promote sustainable economic 
growth? 
 
Question 2 
(Organisational innovation) 
(Oltra et al., 2010) 
How can “X” work with the 
businesses that it regulates to 
encourage them to adopt sustainable 
innovations? 
 
Question 3 
(Types of regulatory 
instrument) 
(Fischer et al., 2003; Kesidou 
and Demirel, 2012; Porter and 
Van der Linde, 1995-b) 
How effectively can good business 
decisions that are good for the 
environment be stimulated through 
direct regulation? 
 
Question 4 
(System-level sustainable 
innovation) 
(Adams et al., 2015) 
Could “X” operate green technology 
schemes/incubators for green 
entrepreneurs?  Could “X” help 
companies in its region develop 
export markets for its environmental 
innovations? 
 
Question 5 
(Future perspectives) 
(OECD, 2015; OECD, 2017) 
What future opportunities do you 
think “X” could take advantage of, 
given current trends and 
developments? 
 
Question 6 
 
Who else would you recommend that 
we could interview? 
 
Reflections on 
Interview 
 
 
  
 
